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To what extent can meaning be attributed to nature, and what is the relationship
between such “natural sense”and the meaning of linguistic and artistic expressions? To
shed light on such questions, this essay lays the groundworkfor an “ontology ofsense ”
drawing on the insights of phenomenology and Merleau-Ponty’s theory of expression . We
argue that the ontological continuity of organic life with the perceived world of nature
requires situating sense at a level that is morefundamental than has traditionaly been
recognized. Accountingfor the genesis of thisprimordial sense and the teleology of expres-
sive forms requires the development of an ontology ofbeing as interrogation, as suggested
by Merleau-Ponty’s later investigations.
The relation between nature and language may seem, at first glance, t o
be of merely regional philosophical interest, relevant primarily to theorie s
of expression and perhaps to environmental philosophy. 1 But a little reflec-
tion reveals that the relation between nature and language is pivotal for
virtually all of continental philosophy in this century. Derrida has argued
quite famously that the entire problematic of phenomenology flows from
Husserl’s differentiation, in the opening pages of the Logical Investigations,
between “natural” indication and linguistic signification . 2 The relation
between the natural and phenomenological attitudes, then, is bound up
with the distinction–-a juridical distinction, Derrida argues, that cannot
finally be maintained in any pure way–between natural signs and gestures,
on the one hand, and the iterability of ideal significations on the other.
Nature versus language . Or consider Merleau-Ponty’s analysis in The Prose
of the Worldof the painstaking emergence of linguistic sense, and ultimately
the abstract languages and concepts of science and mathematics, from our
embodied perceptual dialogue with the world, that is, the gradual blos-
soming of linguistic signification from our inherence in the substratum o f
natural meaning .3 Nature giving rise to language . Or, once again, consider
Foucault’s archeology of the hu man sciences in The Order of Things, a work
that traces the very appearance of the modern conception of m an and of
the contrast between “nature” and “human nature” to a transformation
of language : the discourse of representation that subtended the Classical
episteme, with its continuity between words and things, is replaced by an
analytic of finitude according to which “man” first conceives of himself as “a
being whose nature . . . is to know nature .” 4 What was once a continuity o f
language with nature transforms into a discontinuity. And, to take one last
example, consider Deleuze’s analyses in The Logic of Sense that treat sense as
the hinge between things and propositions, as a pure event or surface effec t
that is neither physical nor mental, but that makes signification possible
precisely by distinguishing itself purely from the “edible nature” of bodies . 5
Sense, as neither nature nor language, operates as a kind of slippery surfac e
between the two. Crucial for each of these four positions is precisely the
relation between nature and language, or rather the mediations, effects ,
and strata that traverse this relation . An analysis of the development of
continental thought in the twentieth century could perhaps be develope d
around this motif.
The present essay is concerned, however, with the systematic and
methodological issues raised by this relation rather than its historical de-
velopment . The recurring thread in the relation of nature and language for
the four philosophers mentioned above is the concept of noema or sense.6
Our concern therefore is with the ontological status of sense: is sense “natu-
ral,” and if so, what is its relation with linguistic meaning? It is valuabl e
to remember here that the French word sens and the German Sinn signify
not only “meaning” but also “direction.” To ask whether nature has a sense ,
therefore, is also to ask whether it has a direction, a telos. The examination
of nature’s sense has implications then for a metaphysics of nature and the
problem of teleology.7 Our examination will proceed by first considerin g
the dilemma that phenomenology faces in its analysis of sense, specifically
in its attempt to situate sense with respect to subjectivity . We will then
evaluate attempts to bypass this dilemma using the concepts of life and
style suggested by Merleau-Ponty, taking into account Foucault’s criticisms
of Merleau-Ponty’s theory of expression . Consideration of the ontological
continuity of life and nature will lead us, next, to recognize the dimension o f
sense as more primordial than subjectivity and the emergence of meaning in
language as an operation derivative from this more fundamental dimensio n
of sense. We conclude with the suggestion that further exploration of the
ontology of sense take as its point of departure Merleau-Ponty’s investiga-
tions of interrogation as a fundamental ontological operation .
The first stage of our investigation of the ontology of sense concern s
the contributions of phenomenology. Consider the classic example of the
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perception of a tree . Our pe rceiving intends a certain object, the tree . But
here constitutive phenomenology will distinguish between the tree as a
transcendent thing and the tree-sense, the noema, that serves as the object -
pole of my intentional act . This sense is ideal, that is, iterable : what I see is a
tree, just as I have seen trees before and can see them again, just as you and
I can see this same tree at the same time . This ideal noema is open for my
inspection, indeed is implied by my noetic act, and is therefore present t o
consciousness . Rather than finding the noema to be on the side of nature ,
along with the transcendent tree, we find it on the side of the subject, as the
object pole of the subject’s intentional relation . It follows that sense is not i n
nature but in the subject . Its iterability situates it on the side of ideality, or
language, not on the side of indication or natural relations . Here, then, we
can draw a sharp distinction between causality, as a relation within nature ,
and intentionality, as a relation of sense .
On the other hand, our example is of a pe rceptual encounter, a seeing
of the tree, and this seeing is inherently corporeal. In order to make out th e
tree as a tree, my eyes must be capable of focusing on it, of selecting and
making explicit what they find implicit in the visual panorama. Pe rception
involves selection and stylization–not only spatial but also temporal8–and
yet I cannot make myself see a tree where none exists . So, “something” in
the world must lead my eyes toward the focus that they achieve : an emerging
sense, a natural telos . My body is as much passive as active in the exc hange
that gives rise to the emergence of the sense “tree .” The sense is neither “out
there” waiting to be picked up like a lost coin, nor is it something my bod y
fabricates tout seul; rather, sense arises h deux. Sense is therefore autochtho-
nous, rooted in a corporeal exchange with the world .
We arrive, then, at the classical dilemma sense poses for phenomenol -
ogy: is sense to be situated on the side of the subject, as the very principle s
of phenomenology seem to imply, or is sense in some way bestowed on u s
by the world, as a phenomenological investigation of our corporeality has
been led to conclude? This latter position, that our embodied dialogue wit h
nature gives rise to sense, has received considerable attention from ecologi-
cal theorists over the last several years due to the efforts of David Abram ,
who himself builds on the foundation laid down by the earlier work o f
Merleau-Ponty. 9 According to this position, sense arises at the conjunction
of the world and the embodied subject and lies at the root of human expres-
sion and language. Although Merleau-Ponty usually discusses the human
subject, it is clear that this description may be extended to animal life as
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well . 10 Rather than to the world-subject conjunction, sense would be mor e
accurately attributed to the meeting point of world and life. All life carrie s
with it an evaluative projecting into the world . As Hans Jonas puts the point ,
metabolism is the “first form of freedom .” 11 Life values and chooses; it throws
a world up before itself and is therefore already intentionally engaged rathe r
than merely causally connected. Life and sense go hand in hand.
For Merleau-Ponty, there is a clear relation of continuity between
sense, at this root level of world and life interaction, and specifically human
levels of expression such as language. Sense is t ransferred from nature to
language through the medium of the body. In Phenomenology of Perception,
for example, Merleau-Ponty claims that conceptual signification is founde d
on what he calls “gestural signification” or the style of language. 12 The styl e
of a word or a language would include its tone and accent, its gestural or
emotional significance, which provides the original mode of access to it s
linguistic signification . This generalizable “emotional essence” refers back
to a mode of behavior or experience of the body as a “natural power ofex-
pression .” 13 The style of the word is a gesture, a comportment of the body ,
its way of vibrating or resonating with its surroundings . 14 Such gestura l
significations–words, vowels, phonemes–are, Merleau-Ponty tells us, “so
many ways of singing the world” since they extract and, in the strict sense
of the word, express the “emotional essence” of things . 15 The body squeeze s
the emotional essence out of things like juice from an orange, and style i s
this juice . Different l anguages, on this view, are just so many variation s
on the body’s manner of expression, and the unique worlds that result are
never entirely translatable . 16 Style acts as the spark that arcs the gap between
natural sense and conventional expression.
Merleau-Ponty’s account has been criticized by Foucault for its sugges -
tion that expression amounts to no more than “pressing out” the implicit ,
taking-up the tacit meanings pre-inscribed in nature . 17 But in fact, to treat
sense as ready-made would contradict Merleau-Ponty’s description, since i t
would eliminate the body’s role in the constitution of sense and eliminate the
possibility of different and incompatible worlds of meaning . Furthermore ,
on this view, the sense would preexist the sensible world that provides it s
context . The body no more constructs a sensible world piecemeal than a
language is constructed by the mere accumulation of individual words . The
part makes sense only on the basis of the whole ; the thing or the word can
be invested with sense only on the basis of a world of sense . Therefore, we
must distinguish more clearly than did Merleau-Ponty between, on the one
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hand, the stylizing and expressive act that takes place on the background
of an already present world and, on the other, the founding of a world of
meaning as such . The description that would have the body expressing a
pre-existing sense could apply only to expression within an established world,
that is, secondary or habitual expression.
Describing the radical creation of sense, the founding of a new world o f
meaning, proves more difficult precisely because it cannot be set off agains t
the background of an existing world or norm. Like the founding of the world
described by primal religions, such a radical creation requires the revelatio n
of a fixed point, a central axis that orients all future developments. 18 The fixed
point is established against a backdrop of chaos, just as the “diagram,” for
Francis Bacon, opens the new world of a painting precisely by bringing about
the catastrophic collapse of figurative space . 19 This institution of a world
is not a creation ex nihilo flowing from the fountainhead of subjectivity ; i t
can neither be traced to a “creative gesture” or act nor simply ascribed to th e
body’s “natural expression,” which always implies a norm or background .
What is the motive force behind the radical genesis of a world of sense ?
Before we return to this question, consider a second and not unrelate d
issue raised by Merleau-Ponty’s account of expression, namely, the conti-
nuity between “levels” or “mediums” of expression. In his commentary on
Malraux’s history of painting, Merleau-Ponty offers a full-blown teleology o f
expression commencing with perception, progressing through painting, and
culminating in language . Perception stylizes at the outset, since it sets up a
pattern of resonance between myself and the thing, allowing my body to feel
within itself the divergence from the norm that the thing introduces : 20
It is sufficient that we shape in the manifold of things certain hollows ,
certain fissures—and we do this the moment we are alive—to bring
into the world that which is strangest to it : a sense . . . . There is style
(and hence signification) as soon as there are figures and grounds, a
norm and a deviation, a top and a bottom, that is, as soon as certain
elements of the world assume the value of dimensions against which
we subsequently measure all the rest and through which we indicat e
all the rest.21
This strange sense, after being introduced into the brute event of the worl d
through our first division of figure from ground in perception, is reincar-
nated, Merleau-Ponty tells us, in progressively ductile expressive media : from
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the perceiving body itself, to paint and canvas, lastly to air and written letters .
All the while, it also gains an increasingly refined tendency toward self-reflec-
tion: one cannot perceive about perception, and painting about painting is
perhaps possible only as an ideal limit . But language is immediately char-
acterized by its self-torsion, the emergence of which is paralleled by that o f
self-reflection proper, a self-presence of thought so complete as to offer th e
appearance of having done away with the need for any medium whatsoever.
Despite its obvious attraction for the ecologically-minded philosopher wh o
sees in this theory of expression a way to recuperate a meaning and value fo r
nature in its own right, this theory leaves much unanswered, e .g ., What is
the ontological status of the sense that is t ransferred from one medium to
the next, and what motivates its progress through the series ?
As we have seen thus far, the two questions confronting the theory o f
sense that we are developing concern the nature of the radical genesis o f
sense and an ontological account of the teleology of sense . Despite these
questions, to which we will return momentary, there is something about
the continuity thesis of sense that remains intuitively compelling, and thi s
stems from its commitment to an ontological continuity between humans
and nature (taking “nature” here broadly, as does Whitehead, as equivalent
to the perceived world) .22 Such an ontological continuity between ourselves
and the natural world carries some radical implications that might fruitfully
be compared with the Buddhist concept of “dependent arising,” according
to which all things are interdependent, inseparable, and in a process of
constant becoming . 23 Where do my boundaries as a hu man being begin and
end? Not with my skin, as we typically assume, given the constant proces s
of interaction between my body and the physical world around me both a t
macro- and microscopic levels . My bodily integrity is entirely dependent, a t
this moment, on such external forces as the air pressure within this room ,
while the content of my consciousness is inextricably interlaced with the
sensory input I continuously receive from the whole of the world as it meets
my eyes, ears, nostrils, and skin. If “I” engage in an expressive act, is it not
the very being of the world with which I am inextricably intertwined tha t
is “doing” the expressing? Would we not more accurately say that expressing
is happening, that it is a process around which one cannot draw distinct
boundaries, since it includes, at least marginally, the activity of the entire
world as this impinges on the situation and perspective that I call mine?
Considered in this light, we can better understand the metaphysical rami -
fications of Merleau-Ponty’s reference to our being as that of a “hollow”
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within the world24 or as being’s own self-interrogation . 25 Everything comes
to pass as if expression arose through the world’s striving to be perceived, t o
be painted, spoken, and thought . My body’s struggle to express would then
be nothing other than the world’s struggle to express itself through me, as
if I were an organ of this single massive body named Nature . Human being
might be thought of as nature’s engine of self-expression, its own coming-to -
consciousness . As Merleau-Ponty affirms, quoting Cezanne, “The landscape
thinks itself in me, and I am its consciousness.”26
If the ontological continuity of humans with nature is pushed far
enough, we must leave behind the idea that human subjects, or even livin g
agents, are the extractors of sense, since sense involves the operation of th e
whole of being, even if this coming to expression is a regional operatio n
within the whole. Sense does not originate as the reso nance or feed-back
loop obtaining between a pre-existing thing and perceiving body, but rather
as the resonance from which these moments may be secondarily derived by
abstraction . We arrive here at a deeper ontological dimension of sense than
that described earlier by the dialogue of world and life, the fundamental
dimension from which the terms of this dialogue arise by abstraction . This
deeper dimension can be called “natural” only in a singular way, since thi s
notion of “nature” is no longer defined by the classic opposition with the
artificial, the human, or the organic. Rather, the term “nature” here can
name only the continuity of being itself. Investigating the ontological statu s
of sense and the motivations behind a teleology of sense leads us, therefore ,
to an examination of being as such, and we c an turn once more to Mer-
leau-Ponty’s later investigations for inspiration . In primordial perception ,
Merleau-Ponty writes, subject and object, noesis and noema, are blurred
to the point of disappearing into one sole “intentional fabric,” namely, the
“flesh of the sensible .” 27 Rather than claiming that the body extracts the
emotional essence of things, we should instead speak of a single reverbera-
tion out of which perception, gesture, painting, and speaking emerge.2 8
Sense is ontologically more primordial than either a sense-bestowing subject
or a sense-carrying subs tance, more basic than the poles of life and world
themselves . It is the pure event from which the two orders of subject and
object, or the two series of causality and intentionality, split off. Ex-pression
presses world and life out of the cauldron of sense . And if sense is onto-
logically basic, the classical dilemma of teleology falls by the wayside : we
no longer need choose whether nature’s telos is inherent or a projection of
subjectivity, since the telos of sense lies at a level deeper than the separation
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of nature and subjectivity.
But if the world thinks itself in me, if I am its consciousness, does thi s
guarantee my right to speak on behalf of nature? Are all of my gestures and
utterances, in fact, the pure “voice of nature” channeled apriori through
my being? Not exactly, for several reasons . First of all, each expression is
no more than a single limited moment of the world, the world as exposed ,
in the photographic sense of the term, from a single unique perspective .
The singing of the entire world would require an infinite chorus of voices,
one for each Abschattung of every object, one for each possible perspective
on the world and across every sensory dimension.29 And, second, even i f
all of these expressions could give voice at once, the result would be no t
cosmic harmony but cacophony, since the perspectives that they represen t
are incompossible : the perceived world is composed of “incompatible and
simultaneous ‘faces’”30 arrayed like focal points on intersecting spatial and
temporal axes, like a grand multi-dimensional stage set . There is no guaran-
teed harmony, no overarching scheme that would organize each expressed
perspective, like interlocking monads, into a god’s-eye view. Nor, thirdly, is
there any guarantee that sense traverses different mediums without distor-
tion or remainder, as if a voice could be so pure that it carries nothing o f
the movement of the air. This is not a fault of sense but the very means o f
its expression, what Merleau-Ponty calls a “good error.”3 1
Moving forward with this theory of sense would require taking seri-
ously Merleau-Ponty’s remarks that treat interrogation as a fundamenta l
ontological operation, and specifically his interpretation of the emergence
of sense as the self-interrogative becoming of being. This is a radicalization
of Heidegger’s claim, in Being and Time, that the being of Dasein is the
being of a question and, in particular, the being of the question of being .
For Merleau-Ponty, our flesh is the node or pivot around which the fles h
of the world turns back on itself, interrogating itself. The claim that sense
is ontologically fundamental, then, must be qualified, since this may give
the impression that sense is something present, a being . But sense is rather
a happening, the event of radical creation, a vortex of self-reflective move-
ment whose ongoing rupture throws off questioner and questioned, subjec t
and object, body and thing, as so many by-products of its fission . In fact,
it is in just this interrogative movement, the self-palpitation of the world’s
flesh, that we find the engine for a teleology of expression . Each expressive
modality—perception, art, language—carries forward an increasingly supple
reflexive movement, a constant becoming that is as much absent as present,
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much more a blind stumbling forward into an unknown future than the
unwrapping of a pre-packaged and present sense . An understanding of being
in the interrogative mode might resolve our outstanding questions about the
being of sense and the teleology of expression . And if the activity of sens e
is a radical self-wondering, it would be fair to say not only that philosophy
begins in wonder, but that nature does as well .
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